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COMMENTS
SUPREMACY CLAUSE VS. TWENTY-
FIRST AMENDMENT: LOW COST
MILITARY LIQUOR OVER STATE
ANTIDIVERSION REGULATIONS IN
UNITED STATES v. NORTH DAKOTA
The twenty-first amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion repealed national prohibition under the eighteenth amend-
ment.1 Section 2 of the amendment reserves to the states the au-
thority to regulate intoxicating liquors brought within their
borders.2 Although early United States Supreme Court decisions
' U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (1919, repealed 1933). Ratified in 1919, the eighteenth
amendment prohibited "the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and
all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes." Id.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. Section 2 provides: "The transportation or importation
into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." Id.
The language of section 2 of the twenty-first amendment bears remarkable similarity to
both the Wilson Act of 1890 and the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913. The Wilson Act provides in
part:
All... intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into any State or Territory
or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale, or storage therein, shall upon arri-
val in such State or Territory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of
such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the same
extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been pro-
duced in such State or Territory ....
27 U.S.C. § 121 (1982).
The Webb-Kenyon Act provides that "[t]he shipfiaent or transportation ... of any...
intoxicating liquor ... to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the
original package or otherwise, in violation of any law of such State, Territory, or District of
the United States ... is prohibited." 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1982).
The close resemblance of the twenty-first amendment to the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon
Acts has led some authorities to conclude that the primary object of the amendment was to
constitutionalize the purposes behind those Acts. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205-06
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construed section 2 as according plenary powers to the states,' and
the amendment has consistently been interpreted as granting
states considerable regulatory authority over liquor,4 no longer is
this authority deemed to be exclusive or absolute.5 The Supreme
(1976). The Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts were primarily intended to enable the states to
overcome regulatory limitations frequently imposed by operation of the commerce clause.
See id. The principal effect of the twenty-first amendment is that it creates "an exception to
the normal operation of the Commerce Clause." See id. at 206; see also Battipaglia v. New
York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 169 (2d Cir. 1984) (§ 2 grants states authority to
regulate liquor without commerce clause limitations), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985). For
an overview of the history of the twenty-first amendment, see Note, The Effect of the
Twenty-First Amendment on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 COLUM.
L. REv. 1578, 1579-83 (1975).
1 See, e.g., Joseph F. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395, 398 (1939) (twenty-first
amendment permitted state law to bar importation of liquor from other states); see also
Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S 401, 404 (1938) (discrimination against imported
liquor allowed although not an incident of reasonable regulation).
The Supreme Court first had occasion to interpret section 2 of the amendment in State
Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936). The Court sustained a
California tax on imported liquor. Id. at 64. In so doing, it rejected the challengers' argu-
ment that the amendment should be construed just as the statutes upon which it was alleg-
edly modeled had been construed. Id. at 63-64; see supra note 2 (text of statutes). The
Court rejected an appeal to construe section 2 narrowly, noting that the broad language of
the amendment was unambiguous. Young's Market, 299 U.S. at 63-64. By relying solely on
the language of the amendment and broadly interpreting the powers granted states under
the amendment, the Young's Market Court enabled the state tax regulation to withstand
both commerce clause and equal protection challenges. See id. at 62, 64; see also Ziffrin, Inc.
v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939) (twenty-first amendment grants states right to com-
pletely restrict transportation of liquor into state).
' See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITuTioNAL LAW § 6-24, at 476-77 (2d ed. 1988).
"[C]onsiderable power to control importation is reserved to the states by the twenty-first
amendment. The amendment sanctions state action which taxes, regulates, or completely
bars the importation of liquor for actual use within the state itself, even where such action
would be forbidden as to any other commodity." Id.; see also City of Newport v. Iacobucci,
479 U.S. 92, 97 (1986) (per curiam) (twenty-first amendment held to defeat first amendment
claim); New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 718 (1981) (per curiam)
(same); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964) (if state
statute barring passage of liquor through its territory involved any other commodity, it
would violate commerce clause); Young's Market, 299 U.S. at 62 (state fee to obtain license
to import beer valid although would have been invalid as undue burden on interstate com-
merce prior to enactment of twenty-first amendment).
I See, e.g., 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 352 (1987) (Sherman Act defeated
state's twenty-first amendment defense); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 108 (1980) (state cannot tax imported liquor in violation of
import-export clause); South Dakota v. Dole, 791 F.2d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 1986) (in commerce
clause area, state power over liquor not exclusive), aff'd, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); see also Com-
ment, Pre-Empting State Action Taken Pursuant to the Twenty-First Amendment, 53
TEMP. L.Q. 590, 603 (1980) (Supreme Court has narrowed state powers under § 2).
In addition, the Supreme Court has articulated certain limitations to the states' broad
powers under the twenty-first amendment. For example, the Court has stated that the com-
merce clause is not completely inapplicable in the area of liquor regulation. See, e.g., Midcal
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Court, for example, has invalidated state laws regulating liquor
sold on federal enclaves over which the federal government exer-
cised exclusive jurisdiction. Recently, in United States v. North
Dakota,7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
further eroded the states' regulatory power by declaring unconsti-
tutional North Dakota's regulation of the sale of liquor to federal
military enclaves8 over which the state and federal governments
Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 110 (while states have substantial discretion to regulate liquor under
§ 2, power "subject to federal commerce power in appropriate cases"); William Jameson &
Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171, 172-73 (1939) (no substance in argument that twenty-first
amendment gives states complete and exclusive control unlimited by commerce clause); see
also Jatros v. Bowles, 143 F.2d 453, 455 (6th Cir. 1944) (federal government not deprived of
all legislative powers regarding intoxicants). The Court has also limited the states' section 2
powers where the import-export clause of the Constitution has been implicated. See, e.g.,
Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341, 344 (1964) (twenty-
first amendment does not permit what is expressly forbidden by import-export clause of the
Constitution). Issues of state power under section 2 have also arisen in the context of equal
protection claims under the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 204-05 (§ 2
of amendment does not prevent invalidation of liquor regulation where there is denial of
equal protection under fourteenth amendment).
' See United States v. State Tax Comm'n, 412 U.S. 363, 368 (1973) [hereinafter Tax
Commission 1]. Known as Tax Commission I, this case involved a federal government chal-
lenge to a Mississippi law which made the State Tax Commission the sole importer and
wholesaler of alcoholic beverages distributed within the state, including any military post.
Id. at 364. The Commission was required to add a markup to the cost of all alcoholic bever-
ages, id. at 364-65, and the federal government challenged the state's authority to enforce
the law as to the military posts. Id. at 366-67. Of the four military installations involved, the
United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction over two, and concurrent jurisdiction over the
other two. Id. at 367. In rejecting the Commission's contention that the twenty-first amend-
ment allowed the state to impose regulations affecting the bases over which the federal gov-
ernment exercised exclusive jurisdiction, the Court emphasized that they were under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government and "constitute[d] federal islands which no
longer constitute[d] any part of Mississippi nor function[ed] under its control." Id. at 375
(quoting United States v. State Tax Comm'n, 340 F. Supp. 903, 906 (S.D. Miss. 1972)).
Consequently, the military posts were not subject to the state's twenty-first amendment
power. Id. at 376; see also Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 538 (1938)
(state could not enforce liquor regulations in park after having ceded exclusive jurisdiction
to federal government).
856 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1988).
8 See 32 C.F.R. § 261.3 (1987). Under Department of Defense policy, liquor purchases
and sales are made by nonappropriated fund instrumentalities ("NAFI's"). Id.; see United
States v. North Dakota, 856 F.2d at 1108.
The NAFI's are operated in accordance with Department of Defense Directive 1015.1
(Aug. 19, 1981), but do not receive federal funding. See 32 C.F.R. § 261.3. One important
function of the NAFI's is to resell the liquor purchased and use the profits generated to
support morale, welfare, and recreational programs for the benefit of military personnel. See
id. Another related Department of Defense regulation provides:
The Department of Defense shall cooperate with local, state, and federal officials
.... However, the purchase of all alcoholic beverages for resale at any camp,
post, station, base, or other [Department of Defense] installation ... shall be in
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exercise concurrent jurisdiction.9
In United States v. North Dakota, the state had enacted regu-
lations in an effort to prevent the unlawful diversion of liquor into
its domestic commerce.10 One regulation required out-of-state sup-
pliers of alcoholic beverages to affix a label to each bottle destined
for a federal military installation indicating that the liquor was ex-
clusively for consumption within the military enclave."' After
learning the regulations would increase the cost of liquor to the
military,' 2 the United States brought suit seeking a declaration
that the regulations were unconstitutional and an injunction
against their enforcement. 3 The state's regulations were invalid
under the supremacy clause,' 4 the United States asserted, because
they conflicted with a federal regulation requiring military pro-
curement of alcohol at the "most advantageous" price. 5 In re-
such a manner and under such conditions as shall obtain for the government the
most advantageous contract, price and other considered factors. These other fac-
tors shall not be construed as meaning any submission to state control, nor shall
cooperation be construed.., as an admission of any legal obligation to submit to
state control, [or] pay state or local taxes ....
32 C.F.R. § 261.4 (1987) (quoting Armed Services Military Club Package Store Regulations,
Department of Defense 1015.3-R, ch. 4, § C).
The Secretary of Defense promulgates these regulations under a statute authorizing the
Secretary to "make such regulations as he may deem to be appropriate governing the sale,
consumption, possession of or traffic in ... intoxicating liquors to or by members of the
Armed Forces." 50 U.S.C. app. § 473 (Supp. IV 1986).
9 United States v. North Dakota, 856 F.2d at 1112.
See id. at 1108.
" See N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 84-02-01-05(7) (1986). This regulation provides in part: "All
liquor destined for delivery to a federal enclave in North Dakota . . . shall have clearly
identified on each individual item that such shall be for consumption within the federal
enclave exclusively." Id.
The other North Dakota regulation required suppliers to file a monthly report disclos-
ing the amount of liquor shipped into the state or returned. See N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 84-02-
01-05(1) (1978).
1 United States v. North Dakota, 856 F.2d at 1109. The military estimated that its
liquor bill would increase by $200,000 to $250,000 since the suppliers would pass on the
costs of complying with the regulations. Id. The court maintained that because this increase
in costs prevented the military from maximizing profits, the regulations conflicted with fed-
eral policy. Id. at 1113.
Id. at 1108.
1 Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. VI. The supremacy clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
15 United States v. North Dakota, 856 F.2d at 1108; see 32 C.F.R. § 261.4 (1987).
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sponse, the State of North Dakota maintained it had acted prop-
erly to prevent the unlawful diversion of liquor into its domestic
commerce under the powers granted states by the twenty-first
amendment."6
On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court de-
nied the United States' motion and granted summary judgment in
favor of North Dakota.17 The court found no conflict between the
state and federal regulations, noting that although the lowest cost
rose, the state's regulation still permitted purchases at the lowest
available cost. 8 The district court also found that even if a conflict
between the regulations existed, the state's interest in preventing
diversion would prevail over the federal interest in purchasing li-
quor at the lowest price.' 9 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed,
holding that the state had no power under the twenty-first amend-
ment to regulate the military's procurement of liquor.20 The court
also concluded that even if the state had jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter by virtue of the twenty-first amendment, its regula-
tions would be preempted by federal law.2'
Writing for the court, Judge Henley noted that the principles
underlying the supremacy clause mandate the general dominance
of federal over state law.22 Relying primarily on the Supreme
I8 United States v. North Dakota, 856 F.2d at 1108.
17 United States v. North Dakota, 675 F. Supp. 555, 559 (D.N.D. 1987), rev'd, 856 F.2d
1107 (8th Cir. 1988). Although the district court granted summary judgment based on its
finding that there were "no genuine issues of material fact," id. at 555, at least one liquor
supplier had contended that the label required by the regulation was actually a "tax stamp."
Id. at 556. This claim was disputed by the state and apparently was not seriously advanced
by the United States. See id. at 556 n.2
I8 Id. at 557.
19 Id. at 559. The district court concluded that the state's interest in preventing diver-
sion of liquor into its stream of commerce was much more significant than the federal inter-
est in keeping costs down. Id. In making this determination, the court relied in part upon
the Supreme Court's decision in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984),
wherein the Court employed a similar balancing test between competing state and federal
interests. Id. at 714-16; see United States v. North Dakota, 675 F. Supp. at 558-59. In
Crisp, however, the Court determined that the balance tipped in favor of the federal inter-
ests, and thus enforcement of the state law was barred. See 467 U.S. at 716.
11 United States v. North Dakota, 856 F.2d at 1112.
2' See id. at 1112-13. The court weighed three considerations in concluding that federal
law preempted the state regulations: (1) the pervasiveness of the federal program; (2) the
need for uniformity; and (3) the danger of conflict between the state law and the federal
program. See id. In its analysis, the court placed considerable emphasis on the third of these
considerations, the danger of state and federal conflict. See id. at 1113.
12 Id. at 1112. The United States v. North Dakota court stated that these principles
included the need for the uniformity of federal law, as well as the need "'to avoid a break-
1988]
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Court's decisions in Tax Commission 123 and 'Tax Commission II,24
Judge Henley acknowledged a state's nearly unlimited authority
when exercising its "core power" under the twenty-first amend-
ment,25 but found that such power ceases when the state exercises
it over an instrumentality of the federal government. 26 Moreover,
the court continued, even if the twenty-first amendment conferred
jurisdiction, the state's regulations would nonetheless be pre-
empted by federal law27 because of the strong federal interest in
procuring alcoholic beverages at the most profitable price.28
Dissenting, Chief Judge Lay asserted that the Tax Commis-
sion cases were inapplicable since North Dakota's regulations con-
stituted neither a tax on the federal government nor an attempt to
regulate liquor consumption on a federal enclave.29 The Chief
Judge also contended that the regulations did not conflict with
down of administration through possible conflicts arising from inconsistent requirements.'"
Id. at 1111 (quoting Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943)). The court also found
that "'[a] corollary to this principle is that the activities of the Federal Government are
free from regulation by any state." Id. (quoting Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445
(1943)).
23 412 U.S. 363 (1973). For the relevant facts and holding of this case, see supra note 6.
24 United States v. Tax Comm'n, 421 U.S. 599 (1975) [hereinafter Tax Commission II].
This case arose from an appeal of the Tax Commission I case after it had been remanded to
the district court. Id. at 603. One issue raised on appeal in Tax Commission II concerned
the constitutionality of a state regulation requiring that liquor suppliers collect and remit to
the Mississippi Tax Commission a tax from two military installations over which the state
exercised concurrent jurisdiction. Id. at 600-01. The Supreme Court concluded that al-
though the liquor suppliers were responsible for the payment of the tax, the legal impact of
the tax fell upon the United States. Id. at 610. The Court thus held the imposition of the
tax unconstitutional. See id. at 614.
22 United States v. North Dakota, 856 F.2d at 1111.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1112. For a discussion of the preemption doctrine, see supra note 21 and infra
note 44.
28 United States v. North Dakota, 856 F.2d at 1113-14. According to the court, this
strong federal interest arose from the long-standing federal policy of purchasing liquor for
the military at a price which remains competitive after the military's markup, and using the
profits for the welfare and morale of military personnel and their families. See id; see also
supra note 8 (discussing regulatory framework and policy).
11 United States v. North Dakota, 856 F.2d at 1115 (Lay, C.J., dissenting). The Chief
Judge underscored the fact that the sole purpose behind North Dakota's regulations was to
prevent unlawful diversion-an objective quite different from the scheme to indirectly tax
the federal government in Tax Commission I. See id. (Lay, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge
Lay, noting the Supreme Court's statement in Tax Commission I acknowledging a state's
right to regulate liquor destined for federal enclaves to prevent diversion, argued that the
effect of the majority's holding was to "slight" the import of the Supreme Court's analysis of
the problem. Id. (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
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federal law or policy, 0 and argued that the majority's holding
would render section 2 of the twenty-first amendment
meaningless. 31
It is submitted that the court's holding unjustifiably elevates
the federal policy of obtaining inexpensive liquor for military en-
claves over the states' strong interest in liquor regulation implicit
in the enactment of section 2 of the twenty-first amendment. This
Comment will examine the extent of a state's twenty-first amend-
ment authority to regulate liquor destined for federal enclaves. In
addition, this Comment will suggest that application of traditional
preemption analysis is inappropriate in the context of a state exer-
cising its regulatory powers under the twenty-first amendment.
THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT AND FEDERAL ENCLAVES
When the propriety of a state's attempt to regulate liquor des-
tined for a federal enclave is challenged, the court must first look
to the jurisdictional status of the territory involved.3 2 It is well es-
tablished that an enclave under exclusive federal jurisdiction rep-
resents a "distinct sovereignty" that, notwithstanding the twenty-
first amendment, is not subject to direct state regulation.3 3 But an
30 Id. (Lay, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Judge said the suggestion that the military
should generally be exempt from state regulation in its procurement of liquor is "ridiculous
in light of the myriad of state regulations applied to distillers and suppliers of liquor." Id. at
1116 (Lay, C.J., dissenting). He also noted that compliance with regulations already in ef-
fect, such as those impacting upon bottling and the treatment of employees, also necessarily
increased the cost of liquor. Id. (Lay, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Judge argued that the
federal policy calling for purchases at the lowest cost contemplated the presence of such
necessary expenses. Id. (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
31 See id. at 1115-16 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
32 See, e.g., Tax Commission I, 412 U.S. 363, 378, 380 (1973) (while enclave under ex-
clusive jurisdiction is "foreign land" to state, enclave under concurrent jurisdiction deemed
within state's territory).
33 See id. at 374 (quoting Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 538
(1938)). The idea that a state's twenty-first amendment powers could not extend to federal
enclaves over which the national government had exclusive jurisdiction was one of the first
exceptions the Supreme Court carved out under the amendment. See Collins v. Yosemite
Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938). In Collins, the State of California had ceded juris-
diction over a national park to the United States. Id. at 523-26. Although California had
reserved some rights under the jurisdictional grant, such as the right to tax persons and
property on the land, the right to regulate liquor was not reserved. Id. at 525-26. California
sought to enforce its Alcoholic Beverage Control Act against a lessee of the park engaged in
the business of selling liquor. Id. at 521-22. The regulatory provisions of the statute beyond
the scope of the rights reserved were held to be unenforceable against the lessee. Id. at 539.
The Court noted that the twenty-first amendment was inapplicable since "[tihe delivery
and use is in the Park, and under a distinct sovereignty," and therefore, "[t]here was no
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enclave over which a state exercises concurrent jurisdiction is not a
distinct sovereignty, and thus may be subject to state regulations
enacted pursuant to the twenty-first amendment.3 4
The United States v. North Dakota court correctly noted that
for federal instrumentalities certain types of state liquor regula-
tion, such as taxation,35 may be precluded by the Constitution
whether or not jurisdiction over the instrumentality is exclusively
within the province of the federal government. 6 It is submitted,
however, that the court erroneously extended the absolute restric-
tion on a state's section 2 regulatory authority over federal en-
claves-an attribute of exclusive federal jurisdiction-to the mili-
tary bases in North Dakota which were under concurrent state
jurisdiction." Although the court relied heavily on the Tax Com-
mission cases, the Supreme Court's decisions in Tax Commission I
and Tax Commission II do not rest on any principle which would
automatically foreclose North Dakota's right to exercise its regula-
tory powers regarding a base over which it has concurrent jurisdic-
tion. Instead, the Tax Commission cases merely bar direct regula-
tion of enclaves under exclusive federal jurisdiction,38 and prohibit
state taxes against federal instrumentalities whether under concur-
transportation into California 'for delivery or use therein.'" Id. at 538 (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. XXI, § 2); see also Tax Commission I, 412 U.S. at 375 (state's § 2 power did not
apply to sale of liquor earmarked for military bases since use on bases was not within the
meaning of "for delivery or use" within the state); Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321
U.S. 383, 386 (1944) (state not justified in seizing liquor destined for military reservation
over which jurisdiction vested exclusively in federal government).
11 See United States v. State Tax Comm'n, 340 F. Supp. 903, 907 (S.D. Miss. 1972),
vacated, 412 U.S. 363 (1973). The district court observed that "as to the concurrent jurisdic-
tion bases, the liquor sales transactions occurred within the jurisdiction of the State of Mis-
sissippi, even where the consumption or other use of the liquor was consummated within the
territorial confines of the base." Id. When this case was presented to the Supreme Court on
appeal in Tax Commission I, the Court cited the above observation of the district judge
with approval. See Tax Commission I, 412 U.S. at 380.
11 United States v. North Dakota, 856 F.2d at 1110; see Tax Commission II, 421 U.S.
599, 614 (1975); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 430 (1819). In
McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall noted that "the power to tax involves the power to de-
stroy," id. at 431, and that a state could therefore not tax the means used by the federal
government when acting pursuant to the Constitution. See id. at 430.
' See Tax Commission II, 421 U.S. at 614. In Tax Commission II, the Supreme Court
stated that "it is a 'patently bizarre' and 'extraordinary conclusion' to suggest that the
Twenty-first Amendment abolished federal immunity as respects taxes on sales to the bases
where the United States and Mississippi exercise concurrent jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Hos-
tetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964)).
3' See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
I See Tax Commission II, 421 U.S. at 613; Tax Commission I, 412 U.S. at 368.
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rent or exclusive jurisdiction.3
As Chief Judge Lay observed in his dissent, the North Dakota
regulations did not amount to a tax on a federal instrumentality,
nor were they an attempt by North Dakota to regulate liquor con-
sumption on the military bases.40 As for the state's interest in
preventing diversion, the Supreme Court in Tax Commission I rec-
ognized that interest as substantial enough that a state could even
prevent the diversion of liquor destined for federal enclaves by reg-
ulation independent of its twenty-first amendment powers.41 It is
therefore submitted that when a state is acting pursuant to the
express terms and intendment of the twenty-first amendment, the
degree of recognition accorded its power and interests should be
substantially heightened.
AN ALTERNATIVE TO PREEMPTION
The supremacy clause provides that acts of the national gov-
ernment, enacted "in pursuance" of the Constitution42 are superior
to acts of a state.43 The preemption doctrine44 is grounded in this
39 See Tax Commission II, 421 U.S. at 612-13.
40 United States v. North Dakota, 856 F.2d at 1115 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
" See Tax Commission I, 412 U.S. at 377. In the absence of conflicting regulation,
Justice Marshall suggested that the State of Mississippi, under its police powers, could regu-
late shipments to military enclaves under exclusive federal jurisdiction during their passage
through the state in order to prevent the unlawful diversion of liquor into its internal com-
merce. Id.; see Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 333 (1964);
Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 396 (1941).
42 See supra note 14 (text of supremacy clause).
"' See Note, The Burger Court and Preemption Doctrine: Federalism in the Balance,
60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1233, 1254 (1985). "The Court generally will not permit state laws
to stand if they conflict with the federal law because they inhibit the legitimate exercise of
federal power." Id.
" Preemption is a "[d]octrine adopted by U.S. Supreme Court holding that certain
matters are of such a national, as opposed to local, character that federal laws pre-empt or
take precedence over state laws. As such, a state may not pass a law inconsistent with the
federal law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (5th ed. 1979).
In Arons v. New Jersey State Board of Education, 842 F.2d 58 (3d Cir. 1988), the court
explained the practical application of the doctrine as follows:
The standard governing federal preemption of state statutes and regulations most
often is based on a clear or unambiguous expression of congressional intent. If
Congress demonstrates an intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling
within that field is preempted. If Congress, however, does not entirely displace
state regulation over the matter, state law is still preempted to the extent it actu-
ally conflicts with the federal law or stands as an obstacle to achieving the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.
Id. at 61; see Hillsborough County v. Automated Laboratories, 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985);
Silkwood V. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
1988]
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clause,45 and the Supreme Court's traditional preemption analysis
strongly favors federal law.4e Nevertheless, when a state acts under
the affirmative grant of power from the twenty-first amendment, it
too is acting pursuant to the Constitution, and thus its acts, at a
minimum, should be accorded equal deference.47 In United States
v. North Dakota, the court held that even if section 2 of the
twenty-first amendment empowered the state to regulate the mili-
tary's suppliers, conflict between federal and state regulations led
to the preemption of the state law.48 It is submitted that while the
use of traditional preemption analysis might generally be appropri-
U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
41 U.S. CONST. art. VI. For the text of the supremacy clause, see supra note 14.
48 See Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467
U.S. 461, 469 (1984) (preemption of state law can occur expressly, implicitly, or by occupa-
tion of field by federal legislation). See generally Note, supra note 43, at 1234-37 (discussing
development of preemption doctrine).
41 See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 713 (1984). In Crisp, Oklahoma
law permitted the sale of alcohol but prohibited television stations from broadcasting liquor
commercials. Id. at 694-95. However, Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") regula-
tions forbade the stations from altering the broadcasting signals they received, some of
which carried liquor advertisements. Id. at 696. Although compliance with state law would
require violation of the FCC regulations, the state threatened the plaintiffs, who were cable
television station operators, with criminal prosecution if they persisted in carrying liquor
advertisements. Id. The station operators brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. Id. The Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma law was preempted by the FCC regu-
lation and that the twenty-first amendment did not prevent preemption of the state law. Id.
at 716. The Court, in rejecting the state's twenty-first amendment claim, stated that "when
a State has not attempted directly to regulate the sale or use of liquor within its bor-
ders-the core § 2 power-a conflicting exercise of federal authority may prevail." Id. at
713. It is suggested that the Crisp Court recognized the propriety of conventional preemp-
tion theory only outside the context of a state's valid exercise of "the core § 2 power"
granted by the twenty-first amendment. Furthermore, it is submitted that this core
power-which the court defines as the authority to "directly ... regulate the sale or use of
liquor within its borders"-plainly incorporates a state's regulatory attempts to prevent the
unlawful diversion of liquor into its domestic commerce. See id. at 713; see also California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980) (under
twenty-first amendment, states have "virtually complete control over whether to permit im-
portation or sale of liquor"); Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363,
364 (1978) (state laws which protect "vital [state] interests" are generally not preempted).
48 See United States v. North Dakota, 856 F.2d at 1112. The United States v. North
Dakota court found several elements of the preemption balancing formula to be relevant.
See id. at 1112-13. It found that the Defense Department's regulation disapproving of the
military's subjection to the control of local authorities in this area evinced an intention to
"completely occupy the field." See id. at 1113. The court noted the need for uniformity,
particularly in view of the national characteristics of the military. See id. Finally, the court
declared the last relevant element-actual conflict with federal policy-the "most decisive,"
since the state's regulations undermined the federal policy of maximizing profits to be used
for the support of military personnel. Id.
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ate when federal and state laws clash, its application is unwar-
ranted when a state exercises its "core power" under section 2 of
the twenty-first amendment.4 9 This "core power" has been defined
by the Court as a state's right to attempt "directly to regulate the
sale or use of liquor within its borders."50 It is suggested that
North Dakota's attempt to prevent the unlawful diversion of liquor
destined for federal enclaves, over which the state had concurrent
jurisdiction, unmistakably falls within the ambit of this definition.
The Supreme Court has recognized that resolution of ques-
tions of state power under the twenty-first amendment demands
something more than the traditional preemption analysis that is
generally employed in the absence of such a constitutional recogni-
tion of state authority.5 1 The Court articulated a balancing ap-
proach in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,52 declar-
9 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 207 (1976). The Craig Court recognized that
state regulation may overcome challenges under other constitutional provisions if the regu-
lation touches an area in which state section 2 authority is "transparently clear." Id. Where
there are two conflicting constitutional provisions, "each provision [should] 'be considered
in the light of the other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any
concrete case.' "Id. at 206 (quoting Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S.
324, 332 (1964)).
50 Crisp, 467 U.S. at 713. In Crisp, the Court also referred to the "core" or "central"
section 2 power of the states as the power to "regulat[e] the times, places, and manner
under which liquor may be imported and sold," id. at 716, as well as "exercising 'control
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distri-
bution system.'" Id. at 715 (quoting Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 110); see also Ziffrin,
Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939) ("State may absolutely prohibit the manufacture of
intoxicants, their transportation, sale, or possession, irrespective of when or where produced
or obtained, or the use to which they are to be put").
" See Crisp, 467 U.S. at 714 (when state liquor regulation conflicts with federal law,
state law may prevail if closely related to core § 2 powers); see also Midcal Aluminum, 445
U.S. at 110 (competing federal and state interests to be reconciled after "careful scrutiny").
In California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972), Justice Rehnquist hinted that certain state
actions under the twenty-first amendment should not be subject to the same traditional
preemption analysis as would other state acts:
While the States, vested as they are with general police power, require no
specific grant of authority in the Federal Constitution to legislate with respect to
matters traditionally within the scope of the police power, the broad sweep of the
Twenty-first Amendment has been recognized as conferring something more than
the normal state authority over public health, welfare, and morals.
Id.
I 2 377 U.S. 324 (1964). The Hostetter Court held that in-state sales of intoxicating li-
quor intended to be consumed only in foreign countries could be placed under Federal Bu-
reau of Customs supervision. Id. at 333-34. The conflicting state regulation was not aimed at
preventing unlawful use of alcoholic beverages within the state, but had been enacted "to-
tally to prevent transactions carried on under the aegis of a law passed by Congress in the
exercise of its explicit power under the Constitution to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions." Id. at 334.
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ing that "[b]oth the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce
Clause are parts of the same Constitution" and "each must be con-
sidered in the light of the other, and in the context of the issues
and interests at stake. 5 3 Similarly, the Court has balanced the
federal interest inherent in the Sherman Act with the state interest
in promoting temperance in a "pragmatic effort to harmonize state
and federal powers. '54
More recently, in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,55 the Su-
preme Court appeared to go even further, implying that a federal
law could prevail over a conflicting state liquor regulation only if
the state regulation did not directly stem from an exercise of "the
core § 2 power. '56 The Crisp Court, faced with a direct conflict
between a federal regulation and a state law, 57 noted that the "cen-
tral question presented" was "whether the interests implicated by
a state regulation are so closely related to the powers reserved by
the Twenty-first Amendment that the regulation may prevail, not-
withstanding that its requirements directly conflict with express
federal policies."'58 It is evident that this approach to resolving
questions of state power under section 2 is far removed from tradi-
tional preemption analysis under which a direct conflict would in-
variably be resolved in favor of federal law.59 Under the Crisp ap-
proach, it appears that so long as the state's authority is squarely
within the realm of a state's "core power," the state regulation
53 Id. at 332; see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
109-10 (1980). The Midcal Aluminum Court held that a violation of the Sherman Act
caused by the state's wine pricing program was not superseded by the twenty-first amend-
ment because the state's interest in promoting temperance was not substantial and was out-
weighed by the federal objectives underlying the Sherman Act. See id. at 113-14.
" 467 U.S. 691 (1984); see supra note 47 (discussing facts in Crisp). Although the Crisp
Court concluded that the state statute was preempted, this determination was made only
after the Court had weighed the respective federal and state interests. See 467 U.S. at 714-
16. The decision was based on the Court's finding that the state regulation, which prohib-
ited certain liquor advertisements, "engage[d] only indirectly the central power reserved by
§ 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment." See id. at 715.
" See Crisp, 467 U.S. at 713.
17 Id. at 696-97.
58 Id. at 714. The Crisp Court recognized the broad power of the states to "regulate the
importation and use of intoxicating liquor within their borders." Id. at 712. Section 2 per-
mits states "to impose burdens on interstate commerce in intoxicating liquor that, absent
the Amendment, would clearly be invalid under the Commerce Clause." Id. See generally
Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1206-94 (1985) (tracing rulings and Supreme Court
trends with respect to dormant commerce clause and attempted state protectionism).
19 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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should prevail." Even if the Crisp Court did not intend to imply
such, however, it is submitted the Court's language does at least
infer the Eighth Circuit's application of traditional preemption
analysis improperly disregarded the unique authority accorded
states by the twenty-first amendment.
Thus, a court's analysis should begin with an inquiry as to the
degree to which a state liquor regulation derives from the state's
"core § 2 power."61 As suggested, the United States v. North Da-
kota court erred because it failed to address this issue as a prelimi-
nary matter, and instead applied traditional preemption analysis.
Moreover, it is submitted that since traditional preemption analy-
sis should not apply, a court must look to the purposes of the com-
peting regulations and competing constitutional provisions, and
determine, on a case by case basis, which regulations represent the
more compelling interests in light of the goals of the United States
Constitution. Only after such a determination is made, it is sug-
gested, may a court legitimately find a state regulation under sec-
tion 2 preempted by federal law.
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court has significantly narrowed its
earlier interpretations regarding the reach of a state's regulatory
power under the twenty-first amendment, it has nevertheless con-
tinued to recognize substantial state authority where state liquor
regulations satisfy the express provisions of the amendment. In
holding state regulations directly implicating the "core § 2" power
invalid, the Eighth Circuit's decision represents a departure from
this approach and serves to frustrate the policies underlying the
twenty-first amendment.6 2 In order to satisfactorily resolve con-
flicts that arise between state liquor regulations and federal law, a
court must recognize that state liquor regulations derive their au-
thority from the federal constitution. Preemption of a state law
60 See Crisp, 467 U.S. at 713-14.
"' See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 41 (1966). The Seagram
Court stated that "[c]onsideration of any state law regulating intoxicating beverages must
begin with the Twenty-first amendment." Id.; see Olitsky v. O'Malley, 597 F.2d 295, 299 (1st
Cir. 1979); see also California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118-19 (1972) (state regulation under
§ 2 entitled to "added presumption" of validity).
62 See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 352-60 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor has noted that the legislative history of the twenty-first amendment
reveals a "clear legislative intent to free state regulation from federal interference." Id. at
358 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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should only occur where the federal interest is greater. This ap-
proach is more in accord with the language and spirit of the Con-
stitution than the traditional preemption analysis utilized by the
United States v. North Dakota court, under which federal law will
almost invariably prevail.
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